In this paper, we present dynamic systems over encrypted data that compute the next state and the output using homomorphic properties of the cryptosystem, which has equivalent performance to the linear dynamic controllers over real-valued signals. Assuming that the input as well as the output of the plant is encrypted and transmitted to the system, the state matrix of the system is designed to consist of integers. This allows the proposed dynamic system to operate for infinite time horizon, without decryption or reset of the state. For implementation in practice, the use of cryptosystems based on Learning With Errors problem is considered, which allows both multiplication and addition over encrypted data. The effect of injecting errors during encryption is in turn controlled under closed-loop stability. 0 1 0 0 0 0 −k J −b J k J 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 k J 0 −2k J −b J k J 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 k J 0 −k J −b J
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen the development of networked control systems, and the threat of cyber-attacks has been a major problem. Against the intrusion of unauthorized access to computing devices in the network, the use of homomorphic encryption has been introduced [1] - [3] , so as to protect all the data in the network by encryption while the control operation is directly performed on the encrypted data without decryption. As the significance of encrypted control is elimination of the decryption key from the network so that it decreases the vulnerability, it has been applied to various targets such as quadratic optimization [4] , average consensus [5] , cooperative control [6] , model predictive control [7] , and reset control [8] .
However, dynamic control operation over encrypted data has been a challenge, in which the state of the controller is recursively updated as an encrypted variable and managed without the decryption. As it requires recursive multiplication with fractional numbers in general, it is necessary for digital controllers to truncate the significand of the state from time to time, to avoid the overflow (see Section III-A). Such truncation would be performed by right shift or division of numbers, but it is impossible for general homomorphic cryptosystems to perform the division of messages an infinite number of times.
As a consequence, it has been a common concern in literature, and several attempts have been made to deal with linear dynamic controllers, but they have been necessarily based on periodic "reset" of the controller state. For example, the use of bootstrapping technique [9] of fully homomorphic encryption is considered in [2] , for the refreshment of the state and unlimited operation. However, its computational complexity hinders it from being used in practice. In [8] , the reset of the state to the initial value is considered, but as it may lose its value, it may result in the degradation of the performance.
In this paper, we propose a method to perform the operation of linear dynamic controllers over encrypted data, for infinite time horizon without the reset or decryption of the state. Following the observation made in [10] that linear systems having integer state matrix avoids the overflow problem without the truncation of the significand of the state (see Section III-B), the proposed scheme is based on the conversion of controllers to have integer state matrix. Treating both the input and the output of the plant as external input of the controller, it will be seen that any linear controller can be converted to have integer state matrix but have the same input-output relation, so that it can operate for infinite time horizon over encrypted data without the reset. The parameters of the proposed controller is suggested, to prevent the performance degradation.
The proposed method is applicable with any cryptosystems that allow additions over encrypted data, such as the Paillier encryption [11] , but the use of recent cryptosystems based on Learning With Errors (LWE) problem [12] , [13] is also suggested. Compared with the Paillier cryptosystem that has been commonly used for control operations, as in [3] - [8] , advantages of using LWE-based schemes are listed as follows:
• LWE-based schemes have both abilities of addition and multiplication over encrypted data, so that it can protect both control parameters and signals, by encryption. • Based on the worst-case lattice problem instead of the factoring problem, they are known as post-quantum cryptosystems, i.e., secure against quantum computers [14] . • With the Paillier encryption, the operation units over encrypted data consist of exponentiations and divisions, so that it may require computation methods such as Montgomery algorithms in practice, as in [15] . In contrast, with the scheme in [13] which utilizes a distinct encryption method for the control parameters, the units consist of matrix multiplications and bit operations so that it has benefits of simple implementation (see Appendix A).
In terms of the use of LWE-based schemes, a key to the security is the injection of random errors to the encrypted messages, which in fact may grow under the recursive operation and hinder the unlimited operation. Thus, in cryptography, it has been handled with the bootstrapping techniques [9] costing a substantial amount of computational resources, so as to reset the grown errors. In contrast, as applied to control systems, we suggest that the effect of the errors can be regarded as external arXiv:1912.07362v1 [eess.SY] 9 Dec 2019 disturbances so that it can be controlled under the closed-loop stability. As a result, it will be seen that the proposed method based on LWE-based encryptions can perform the recursive operation for infinite time horizon and have the same level of performance, without bootstrapping.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section II begins with preliminaries and the problem formulation of unlimited dynamic operation over encrypted data. Section III reviews the overflow problem under recursive multiplication by fractional numbers, and suggests the benefit of integer state matrix. Section IV proposes the novel conversion scheme for linear controllers to have integer state matrix, and presents the main result. Finally, Section V illustrates simulation results, and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM FORMULATION A. Homomorphic Encryption
Let the set of plaintexts (unencrypted data) be given as
which is a set of integers, of cardinality N ∈ N. As all integers divided by N can have the remainder in Z N , we define the modulo operation of a ∈ Z by N , as
in which · is the floor function, so that a mod N ∈ Z N for all a ∈ Z. Then, the set Z N is closed under modular addition and multiplication 1 .
For the cryptosystem to be used throughout the paper, we consider the set C as the space of ciphertexts (encrypted data), and Enc : Z N → C and Dec : C → Z N as the encryption and decryption algorithms 2 , respectively. As homomorphic encryption schemes allow operations over encrypted data in which the decryption of the operation result matches the result of modular arithmetic over plaintexts in Z N , we suppose that the cryptosystem under consideration is at least additively homomorphic; with operations defined in C, it satisfies the following properties 3 . H1: There exists ∆ Enc ≥ 0 such that for every m ∈ Z N , it satisfies Dec(Enc(m)) = m + ∆ mod N , with some ∆ ∈ Z such that |∆| ≤ ∆ Enc . H2: There exists Add : C ×C → C such that for every c 1 ∈ C and c 2 ∈ C, it satisfies Dec(Add(c 1 , c 2 )) = Dec(c 1 ) + Dec(c 2 ) + ∆ mod N , with some ∆ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. H3: There exists IntMult : Z × C → C such that for every k ∈ Z and c ∈ C, it satisfies Dec(IntMult(k, c)) = k · Dec(c) + ∆ mod N , with some ∆ ∈ Z such that |∆| ≤ |k|. A remark is made about the presence of the error term ∆; it is to include recent homomorphic encryption schemes based 1 For integers a and b, we consider a + b mod N for modular addition and a · b mod N for modular multiplication with respect to the set Z N . 2 A secret key (or a public key) should be an argument of the algorithms Enc and Dec, but it is omitted for simplicity. 3 In practice, the property H3 can be obtained from H2 of addition.
on Learning With Errors (LWE) problem [12] , such as [13] or [16] , which necessarily inject "errors" to every message being encrypted, for the sake of security. Otherwise, the use of Paillier encryption [11] , a typical example of additively homomorphic cryptosystems, still can be considered, which satisfies H1-H3 with ∆ = 0 for all cases. Remark 1: In H1, the "injected error" ∆ can be eliminated in practice. Indeed, if we use Enc L : m → Enc(m/L) and Dec L : c → L · Dec(c) instead of Enc and Dec, where · is the rounding operation, and 1/L ∈ N is such that 1/L > 2∆ Enc , we obtain Dec L (Enc L (m)) = m + L∆ = m. However, when it comes to H2 and H3, the error effect cannot be eliminated in general, especially when encrypted data are updated by the operations for unlimited number of times. Additively homomorphic encryption schemes allow both addition and multiplication over encrypted data, but in H3, one may hope to conceal not only the information in c ∈ C but also the multiplier k ∈ Z. To this end, we consider multiplicatively homomorphic property as well, in which a separate algorithm may be used for encrypting the multipliers, in general. For example, the method presented in [13] can be employed, to make the use of the following property (see Appendix A for further details of the encryption method).
H4: There exist Enc :
Exploiting the properties H2 and H4, it is easily seen that matrix multiplication over encrypted messages can be done. Let us abuse notation and write c 1 + c 2 := Add(c 1 , c 2 ) and c · c 1 := Mult(c , c 1 ) for ciphertexts c 1 ∈ C, c 2 ∈ C, and c ∈ C , as usual, and use Enc : Z n N → C n , Enc : Z m×n N → C m×n , Dec : C m → Z m N , and + : C m ×C m → C m to apply the algorithms to each component of a matrix (or a vector). Then, multiplication of a vector [c j ] ∈ C n by a matrix [c ij ] ∈ C m×n is defined as   
so that for every K ∈ Z m×n N and c ∈ C n , it satisfies
where · denotes the infinity norm of matrices or vectors. Utilizing the additively homomorphic properties H2 and H3 only, a property of matrix multiplication analogous to (1) is obtained, having either the multiplier or the multiplicand of the matrix multiplication as plaintext. For example, we define multiplication of a vector [c j ] ∈ C n by a (plaintext) matrix
. Then, for every K ∈ Z m×n and c ∈ C n , it satisfies
with some ∆ ∈ Z n such that ∆ ≤ K + n − 1.
B. Problem Formulation
Consider a continuous-time plant written bẏ
where x p ∈ R np is the state, u p ∈ R m is the input, and y p ∈ R p is the output of the plant, respectively. To control the plant (3), we suppose that a discrete-time linear time-invariant feedback controller has been designed as
where y(t) := y p (t · T s ) ∈ R p , t = 0, 1, ..., is the plant output discretized with the sampling time T s > 0, x(t) ∈ R n is the state of the controller with the initial condition x 0 ∈ R n , r(t) ∈ R q is the reference input, u(t) ∈ R m is the output of the controller, and {e x (t), e u (t), e 0 } are perturbations caused by, for example, quantization of signals. The discrete signal u(t) is fed back to the continuous-time plant
For the case when there is no perturbation, i.e., e x (t) ≡ 0, e u (t) ≡ 0, and e 0 = 0, the states and outputs of (3) and (4) are written as x p (t), y p (t), x (t), and u (t), respectively.
The design of the controller (4) is supposed to (locally) stabilize the closed-loop system. From this rationale, we make two assumptions as follows, the first of which is for the stability of closed-loop system with respect to perturbations.
Assumption 1: Given > 0, there exists η( ) > 0 such that sup t ( e x (t) ) ≤ η( ), sup t ( e u (t) ) ≤ η( ), and e 0 ≤ η( ) implies
for all t ≥ 0 and t ∈ N ∪ {0}, respectively. In addition, the input, the state, and the output of the controller are assumed to be bounded, as follows, which is necessary because of the finiteness of the plaintext space Z N .
Assumption 2: There exist compact sets Y ⊂ R p , R ⊂ R q , X ⊂ R n , and U ⊂ R m , which are known, such that y (t) ∈ Y, r(t) ∈ R, x (t) ∈ X , and u (t) ∈ U, for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Finally, the problem of encrypting controller is posed. The objective is to construct a dynamic system defined on the ciphertext space that satisfies the followings:
• It performs the operation of (4) over encrypted data; the encrypted controller receives encryptions of the plant output y(t), and computes both the next state and the output of the controller, with the use of homomorphic properties of the cryptosystem. The output of the encrypted controller is decrypted, and fed back to the plant.
• The performance of the encrypted controller in the closed-loop is equivalent to that of (4); given > 0, the parameters for the encryption are chosen so that the performance error of the decrypted output u(t) of the controller satisfies u(t) − u (t) ≤ for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}. • It can operate for infinite time horizon, without decryption or reset for the state of the encrypted controller.
III. ENCRYPTION OF DYNAMIC SYSTEMS
In this section, we show how to utilize the properties H1-H4 of the cryptosystem to perform the operation of the given controller (4) over encrypted data. In terms of the dynamic operation for infinite time horizon, the benefit of systems having integer state matrix is addressed.
First, we deal with encryption and operation methods for real-valued signals and parameters, where the limitation on recursive multiplication by fractional numbers is to be seen.
A. Operation over Encrypted Non-integer Real Numbers
Let us begin with encryption of the input of the controller (4). Since the components of signals y(t) and r(t) are not integers in general, they are converted to elements of the plain-
of positive real numbers be step sizes for each component of
, respectively, so that the i-th components y i (t) and r i (t) are quantized as 4
) is chosen so that they are scaled as
where col{·} is the stacking operation for column vectors. The encrypted signals y(t) ∈ C p and r(t) ∈ C q are defined as 5
The precision of the messages in y(t) and r(t) depends on the parameter 1/L as well as the quantizers. For example, the 4 Throughout the paper, we consider a basic type of uniform quantizers, for simplicity. Since Assumption 2 guarantees the boundedness of the signals, the use of saturation functions which determine the range of quantized signals is omitted as well. In practice, for example, the signal y i (t) can be quantized as
where y offset i ∈ R is the parameter for the offset, and y min i ∈ R and y max i ∈ R determines the range for the quantizer, which can be determined with information of the set Y in Assumption 2. 5 In this subsection, it is understood that the size N of the plaintext space is given sufficiently large, so that the modulo operation by N does nothing about the values of y and r. For the general setting of N , see Section III-B. message in the i-th component y i (t) ∈ C of y(t) recovered by decryption will be obtained as
with some integer |∆| ≤ ∆ Enc as in H1. As long as |y i (t)/L|+ ∆ Enc < N/2, the value of y i (t) can be recovered as
where |δ L | ≤ L/2 and |δ r,i | ≤ r y,i /2 so that the recovered result can be made arbitrarily close 6 to y i (t), by increasing the parameters 1/r y,i and 1/L. Thus, encrypted signals y(t) and r(t) can be understood to have the "scaled" values of y(t)/L and r(t)/L, respectively. The computation algorithms over encrypted messages are basically performed with integers, as well, but homomorphic operations such as multiplication by real matrices are also rendered possible using additional "scaling factors". For example, with the help of homomorphic operations defined in Section II-A, the first output u(0) of (4) can be computed over encrypted data as 7
where 1/s ≥ 1 is the scaling factor to convert the matrices to integers, and we suppose x(0) = [0, · · · , 0] ∈ Z n so that x(0) = Enc(x(0)), for simplicity. Then, according to the homomorphic properties, it satisfies
with some ∆ ∈ Z, and as in (8), the message u(0) can be recovered with sufficiently large 1/L and 1/s, as
as long as the norm of the term Ls∆ can be made sufficiently small 8 , and the size N of plaintext space is given sufficiently large. Here, the outcome u(0) can be understood to have the message of u(0)/(Ls). Now, for the dynamic operation of (4) over encrypted data, let us try to compute x(t) ∈ C n and u(t) ∈ C m , t = 1, 2, ..., recursively, which are supposed to have messages of x(t) and 6 In (8), it is worthy of note that the size of the perturbation L∆, which is due to the injected errors of cryptosystems, can be made arbitrarily small with the choice of 1/L. 7 For vectors and matrices, let · and · be component-wise rounding operation and floor operation, respectively. 8 We defer the discussion about the effect of injected errors until the next subsection. u(t) at each time t, respectively. As a first attempt, we make the use of matrices in (4) converted to integers simply by scaling and rounding, just as in (9) . For the first iteration of (4), the state x(1) can be updated as
with the factor 1/s, so that x(1) has the message of x(1)/(Ls). But from the second iteration, the state x(t), which already have been multiplied with the scaling factor 1/s, is again multiplied by the scaled matrix F/s for the next update. As a result, it can be checked, by induction, that the state x(t) at time t should be of the scale 1/(Ls t ), i.e., x(t) should have the message of x(t)/(Ls t ); if it is true at time t, and if x(t) is to be multiplied by the scaled matrix F/s again, the term F/s x(t) will have the message of the scale 1/(Ls t+1 ). Then, the next state x(t + 1) should be computed as
and the message of x(t + 1) becomes of the scale 1/(Ls t+1 ). Similarly, the output u(t) of the system, which is to be decrypted, is computed as
which it is supposed to have the message of u(t)/(Ls t+1 ).
Finally, let us consider the correctness of (11). One may expect that decryption of u(t) yields the correct result as
at each time t, and it might be correct for the first several time steps, just as in (10) . However, it is hopeless as the time goes by, when the matrices in (4) are not integers so that 1/s > 1.
To see why, let us look at the left-hand-side of (12) . Since the length of the range of Dec(·) is N , the length of the range that each component of the left-hand-side can cover is not more than N Ls t+1 at each time t, which tends to zero as t tends to infinity. Hence, no matter how large the parameter N may be chosen, it is impossible to cover the range set of u(t) for the whole time. An attempt might be made to divide the state x(t) by the accumulated factor 1/s t , from time to time, in order to reset the scale of x(t) and u(t). However, for general crytosystems having no more than the properties H1-H4, it is impossible to perform the division over encrypted data unlimited number of times 9 . Therefore, we conclude that a linear dynamic system over encrypted data, implemented in the usual way, fails to operate for infinite time horizon in general.
Getting back to the operation of (11), let us observe that the cause of the failure is the accumulative scaling factor of the state x(t). Furthermore, taking a closer look at the reasoning, let us check that the accumulation is totally attributable to the scaling of the state matrix F to F/s , which would be dispensable if all the entries of F were integers. Following this rationale, toward the dynamic operation over encrypted data for infinite time horizon, the approach of this paper is to convert the given controller (4) to have integer state matrix. To support the validity of this approach, in the next subsection, we show that the encryption of dynamic systems having integer state matrix can be implemented to operate for infinite time horizon, in which the performance as well as the effect of injected errors during the encryption is analyzed.
B. Systems having Integer State Matrix
To describe the encryption method for controllers having integer state matrix, in this subsection, we temporarily assume that the state matrix of (4) consists of integers, i.e., F ∈ Z n×n . In terms of encryption, the benefit of systems having integer state matrix is that they can be converted to systems over integers by scaling, in which the scale of the state is fixed.
To see the detail, let us convert the controller (4) to a system over integers, before the encryption. As the plant output y(t) and the reference output r(t) have already been converted to integers as (6), we choose a scaling factor 1/s 1 ≥ 1 for the matrices G and P in (4) so that the part (4a) of the controller is converted to operate over integers as
Thanks to the state matrix F consisting of integers, it is seen that the construction is noticeably better than (11a); as there is no recursive multiplication by a scaling factor as in (11a), the state x(t) has the value of x(t)/(Ls 1 ) for all t. Indeed, let the errors due to the truncation in (13a) be denoted as
and suppose e x (t) and e 0 in (4) be given by e x (t) = Ls 1 δ x (t) and e 0 = Ls 1 δ 0 . Then, it satisfies
The conversion for the output (4b) is also straightforward; with an additional factor 1/s 2 ≥ 1, it is converted as
so that the output u(t) is of the (fixed) scale 1/(Ls 1 s 2 ). Thus, the plant input u(t) can be obtained as u(t) = Ls 1 s 2 u(t), but more specifically, it is obtained as
where
of positive numbers are the step sizes of the quantizers for the plant inputs. As a result, we can regard the result (14) as the same as the output u(t) of (4b), with the term e u (t) in (4b) given as e u (t) =
is the error caused by truncation in (13b).
According to the following proposition, the effect of truncation errors in the closed-loop system is sufficiently small, when the parameters 1/L, 1/s 1 , 1/s 2 , and 1/r are sufficiently large, where r :
). Proposition 1: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a function α : R 4 → R 3 of polynomials vanishing at the origin such that for every L, s 1 , s 2 , and r satisfying α(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) ≤ η( ), the controller (13) guarantees that (5) holds, for all t ≥ 0 and t ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
So far, it has been seen that the controller (4) can be converted to operate over integers when F ∈ Z n×n , and thus, the encryption of (4) can be implemented by operation of (13) over encrypted messages of integers.
First of all, let us determine the size N of the plaintext space Z N . Just to be on the safe side, one may choose N sufficiently large so that all the messages x(t), y(t), r(t), and u(t) are bounded by ±N/2. Then, the system (13) will be regarded as a dynamics over Z N with modular arithmetic, in which, in fact, the modulo operation by N does nothing about the values of messages. Instead, we suggest that it is enough to have the parameter N to cover the range set of the outcome u(t) of the controller only, because it is the only message to be recovered by the decryption. To this end, with the knowledge of the set U from Assumption 2 which is compact, let us choose integers
for all i = 1, ..., m, in which the terms and {r u,i } m i=1 , given from Assumption 1 and (14), respectively, consider the margin of error. Then, the size N of the plaintext space is determined such that
Now, the encryption for systems having integer state matrix is presented. To conceal the control parameters as well as control signals, they are encrypted as "multipliers" with the algorithm Enc introduced in Section II-A, a priori, as With these encrypted matrices and encrypted signals (7), the dynamic controller over encrypted data is constructed as
in which x(t) ∈ C n and u(t) ∈ C m are the encrypted state and output of the system, respectively, and all the operations of additions and multiplications are based on the homomorphic operations of the cryptosystem. The decryption rule for the recovery of the plant input u(t) is defined as follows; the outcome u(t) is first decrypted as
) so that each i-th component of the result is between u min ,i and u min ,i + N − 1. Then, the plant input u(t) is obtained as
where S u : Z m → R m is the function defined in (14) . Finally, the following theorem states that the dynamic operation of (17) over encrypted data can be performed for infinite time horizon when the given controller (4) has integer state matrix. Compared with the ideal case, i.e., e x (t) ≡ 0, e u (t) ≡ 0, and e 0 = 0, it suggests that the performance error can be made sufficiently small under the stability of closedloop system, by the choice of parameters.
Theorem 1: Suppose F ∈ Z n×n . Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a function β : R 4 → R 3 of polynomials vanishing at the origin such that for every L, s 1 , s 2 , and r satisfying β(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) ≤ η( ), the encrypted controller (17) guarantees u(t) − u (t) ≤ , for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}.
A remark is made about the comparison between the controller (13) with quantized signals and the controller (17) with encrypted signals, in terms of performance. In addition to the effect of truncation of control signals and parameters, the performance error of the encrypted controller is also due to the effect of injected errors, which may affect the messages during the homomorphic operation using the properties H1-H4. From this observation, it can be deduced that either larger parameters of 1/L, 1/s 1 , and 1/s 2 for the scaling, or finer quantization at the actuators and the sensors is required, so as to keep the encrypted controller from the performance degradation.
Fortunately, the following corollary suggest that increasing the parameter 1/L is enough to keep the same level of performance 10 . Even if it requires more capacity for the digital devices in the control loop, it will not require anything about the quantization at sensors and actuators, in the physical layer. 10 In fact, the increase of the factor 1/L as well as the modulus N may change the value of ∆ Mult in H4. But, it can be compensated by the choice of the parameters of encryption scheme so that the value ∆ Mult does not increase. See Appendix A.
Corollary 1: Given > 0, and L, s 1 , s 2 , and r such that α(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) ≤ η( ), there exists L > 0 such that β(L , s 1 , s 2 , r) ≤ η( ).
Proof: We rewrite (37) as β(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) =: α(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) + L · β (s 1 , s 2 ), where β (0, 0) = [0, 0, 0] . As it is clear that β(0, s 1 , s 2 , r) < α(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) and β(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) > α(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) , there exists 0 < L < L such that β(L , s 1 , s 2 , r) = α(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) , by continuity. The operation of (17) is based on both multiplication and addition over encrypted data. But, provided that the information of the matrices in (4) is disclosed, additively homomorphic cryptosystems, which has the property H1-H3 only, can also be used. Indeed, the controller can be encrypted as
where the operation is based on the properties H3 and (2). Since (17) and (18) share the same form of the dynamics for the messages, it is obvious that the statement of Theorem 1 is also true for the controller (18) with (17b).
Especially, for the case of using cryptosystems that does not inject the errors during the encryption, as the example of the Paillier cryptosystem [11] , the following corollary states that the performance of the encrypted controller (18) and that of (13) are identical.
Corollary 2: If H1-H3 hold with ∆ = 0, the controller
Proof: According to (2), the messages x(t) = Dec(x(t)) and u(t) = Dec(u(t)) obey (34), with ∆ x (t) = 0 and ∆ u (t) = 0 for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}, and ∆ 0 = 0, Then, Lemma 2 in Appendix B and Proposition 1 complete the proof.
So far, it has been seen that dynamic systems having integer state matrix can be encrypted to operate for infinite time horizon. As the requirement of integer state matrix may be restrictive in practice, in the next section, we present a method for converting the state matrix (consisting of non-integer real numbers in general) to be integers, so that any linear controller can be encrypted to operate for infinite time horizon, with the equivalent performance.
Meanwhile, for the last part of this section, several examples of controllers having integer state matrix are found as follows. As scaling and truncation is enough for the conversion of signals and parameters to integers, as (13) , they have benefits of simple implementation for the encryption.
Remark 2: Examples of systems having integer state matrix are found as follows.
• Given a controller of finite impulse response, with the transfer function of the form C(z) = n i=0 b n−i z −i , it can be realized as
• Let a discrete Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) controller in the parallel form be given as
where k p , k i , and k d are the proportional, integral, and derivative gains, respectively, T s is the sampling time, and N d ∈ N is the parameter for the derivative filter. It can be realized as
Even if the given state matrix F of (4) does not consist of integers, there may exist an invertible matrix T ∈ R n×n such that it can be transformed to have the state matrix as integers, as T F T −1 ∈ Z n×n . Considering that the entries of the state matrix determine the poles as well as the characteristic polynomial of the system, a couple of sufficient conditions for the transformation of controllers to have integer state matrix can be found, as the following propositions.
Proposition 2: Given F ∈ R n×n , there exists T ∈ R n×n such that T F T −1 ∈ Z n×n , if every eigenvalue of F is such that both the real part and the imaginary part are integers.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B. A sufficient condition for single-output controllers (singleinput plant) is found, under which both matrices F and H of (4) can be transformed to integers so that the scaling of H by 1/s 2 for the conversion is dispensable, i.e., 1/s 2 = 1.
Proposition 3: If the coefficients of the characteristic polynomial of F ∈ R n×n are all integers, and the pair (F, H) is observable where H ∈ R 1×n , there exists T ∈ R n×n such that T F T −1 ∈ Z n×n and HT −1 ∈ Z 1×n .
Proof: It is obvious that the matrix T ∈ R n×n that transforms (4) into the observable canonical form yields
where a i ∈ Z for every i = 1, · · · , n − 1.
IV. CONVERSION TO INTEGER STATE MATRIX
In this section, we remove the temporary assumption F ∈ Z n×n , and propose a method for converting the controller (4) to a system over integers, in which the conversion of state matrix F ∈ R n×n to integers is also considered. And, the main result of the encryption of general linear controllers is presented.
In the previous section, Propositions 2 and 3 considered coordinate transformation of the controller (4) so as to obtain integer state matrix. However, in fact, transformation by itself is not enough to obtain integer state matrix for all cases; the condition T F T −1 ∈ Z n×n implies that the coefficients of its characteristic polynomial det(sI n − T F T −1 ) are integers, where I n ∈ R n×n is the identity matrix, but due to the invariance det(sI n − F ) = det(sI n − T F T −1 ), such T does not exist when the coefficients of det(sI n −F ) are not integers.
To cover the whole class of linear controllers for the encryption as well as the operation for infinite time horizon, we suggest that an auxiliary input for the controller is considered so that it converts the "outward" state matrix to be integers, which in fact does nothing about the performance of the controller. More specifically, the characteristic polynomial of the state matrix, which was invariant under the coordinate transformation, is to be converted by considering both the plant input u(t) the plant output y(t) as external input of the controller; let us observe that, from the relation u(t) = Hx(t) + Jy(t) + Qr(t), the right-hand-side of the part (4a) can be re-written as F x(t) + Gy(t) + P r(t)
with a matrix R ∈ R n×m , where we suppose e x (t) = 0 and e u (t) = 0 for simplicity. Then, regarding the signal u(t) as an external input for the controller, the conversion of state matrix by coordinate transformation can be considered with respect to the new state matrix F − RH.
Then, as the value of the matrix R does not affect the performance of the controller so that it can be freely chosen for the conversion, we consider pole-placement design for R so that the matrix F − RH can be transformed to integers, by change of coordinate. For example, if all the eigenvalues of F − RH can be chosen to be integers, then Proposition 2 will guarantee that there exists T ∈ R n×n such that T (F −RH)T −1 ∈ Z n×n , i.e., the given controller (4) can be converted to have integer state matrix.
As the pole-placement design for the matrix R requires observability of the pair (F, H), which may not be observable in general, we consider Kalman observable decomposition for the controller; with an invertible matrix W = [W 1 , W 2 ] ∈ R n×n such that z 1 = W 1 x ∈ R n and z 2 = W 2 x ∈ R n−n where n ≤ n, the controller (4) is transformed into the form z 1 (t + 1) = F 11 z 1 (t) + W 1 (Gy(t) + P r(t) + e x (t)) (19a)
in which the pair (F 11 , H 1 ) is observable. Then, as the substate z 2 is not reflected in the output u(t) of the controller, we can remove out the part (19b) and obtain the "reduced" controller (19a) with (19c). Finally, the observability of (F 11 , H 1 ) enables the design of R 1 ∈ R n ×m such that all the eigenvalues of F 11 − R 1 H 1 are integers, so that there exists T 1 ∈ R n ×n such that T 1 (F 11 − R 1 H 1 )T −1 1 ∈ Z n ×n , thanks to Proposition 2. As a result, we have the following lemma, which suggests that the state matrix F of the controller (4) can be converted to integers.
Lemma 1: Given (F, H), there exist F ∈ Z n ×n , n ≤ n, H ∈ R m×n , T ∈ R n ×n , and R ∈ R n ×m where rank(T) = n , such that (F + RH )T = TF and H T = H.
Proof: Note that, in (19), the projection z 1 = W 1 x is defined such that F 11 W 1 = W 1 F and H 1 W 1 = H, as it guarantees F 11 (W 1 x) = F 11 z 1 = W 1 (F x) and H 1 (W 1 x) = H 1 z 1 = Hx for every x ∈ R n . Then, the existence is guaranteed with
1 . It completes the proof. Remark 3: Note that the eigenvalues of F may not be of integers in general, as the design of R and T is not unique. Now, with the matrices T and R obtained in Lemma 1, it can be seen how the controller (4) is converted to have integer state matrix, and how it is encrypted. First, by multiplying both sides of (4a) by T from the left, it yields
(20) and thus, with respect to a new variable z := Tx ∈ R n for the state, the converted controller is obtained as the form
where e z (t) = Te x (t) − Re u (t) and e 0 = Te 0 denote the perturbations with respect to the state z(t).
As the output u(t) of the controller is to be treated as an external input of the controller as well, scaling of u(t) = col{u i (t)} m i=1 using the parameter 1/L is considered as the same in (6); we define
where now the parameter 1/L should be chosen such that
. Then, as the state matrix is converted to integers, i.e., F ∈ Z n ×n , the encryption becomes straightforward, as illustrated in the previous section. To convert (21) to a system over integers, we define
and H := H /s 2 . As the same as in (13), we can have the controller operate over integers as
where the state z(t) has the value of z(t)/(Ls 1 ) and the output u(t) has the value of u(t)/(Ls 1 s 2 ), so that the plant input u(t) is recovered as u(t) = S u (u(t)), just as in (14) . Finally, the encryption of the controller (4) based on the conversion of state matrix is proposed as
where z(t) ∈ C n is the state and u(t) ∈ C m is the output, and the encryptions for the converted matrices as well as the encryption for the plant input are defined as As the same as in (17b), the plant input u(t) is obtained as
And, as the end result, the following theorem states that any linear controller can be encrypted to operate for infinite time horizon, in which the performance error can be made sufficiently small, with the choice of parameters. Theorem 2: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a function γ : R 4 → R 3 of polynomials vanishing at the origin such that for every L, s 1 , s 2 , and r satisfying γ(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) ≤ η( ), the encrypted controller (24) guarantees u(t)−u (t) ≤ , for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}. Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B. Remark 4: As the plant input u(t) considered as the output as well as input of the proposed controller, the order of process of the controller at each time step, as well as its welldefinedness, is understood as follows: 1) By induction, at time t, the state z(t) of (24) is stored in the controller. The inputs y(t) and r(t) of the controller, encrypted as (6) and (7), are received. 2) With z(t), y(t), and r(t), the controller (24) computes u(t) and transmit it to the actuator. 3) The plant input u(t) is recovered as (24b) at the actuator, and fed back to the plant. At the same time, the signal u(t) is re-encrypted 11 and transmitted to the controller, as the input u (t) of (24). 4) Finally, with z(t), y(t), r(t), and u (t), the controller (24a) computes the next state z(t + 1).
Remark 5: For single output controllers, i.e., when m = 1, it is able to have both the state matrix F and the output matrix H of (21) as integers, at the same time. Indeed, the pair (F , H ) obtained from Lemma 1 can be assumed as observable without loss of generality, and by Proposition 3, there exists a matrix T ∈ R n ×n such that T F T −1 ∈ Z n ×n and H T −1 ∈ Z 1×n , since F ∈ Z n ×n . This may reduce the size N for plaintext space, because in this case, the scaling of H in (23) is dispensable, i.e., H ∈ Z 1×n with 1/s 2 = 1. In practice, such representation can be obtained by considering the transfer function of (21); let us define
B n −1 z n −1 + · · · + B 0 z n + a n −1 z n −1 + · · · + a 0 + [J, Q, 0 n ×m ],
where B i ∈ R 1×(p+q+1) and a i ∈ Z, for i = 1, · · · , n − 1.
Then, obviously it can be realized as
where both the state and output matrix consist of integers. In Theorem 2, the value γ(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) can be understood as an upper bound of perturbations due to quantization and operation over encrypted data, with respect to the model (4). It can be made arbitrarily small with the choice of parameters since γ(0, 0, 0, 0) = 0, but as discussed in the previous section, increasing the parameter 1/r of quantization may cost more than the others, as it may be determined from specification of the sensors and actuators. In other words, the value of ∂γ ∂r may be sensitive in practice, which in fact depends on the choice of T and R for the conversion; from (32), (33), (38), and (39), it can be computed as
where T ∈ R n×n is such that T · T = I n . Given the parameters (L, s 1 , s 2 , r) with respect to the quantized controller (13) such that α(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) ≤ η( ), Corollary 1 suggested that when encrypting (13) for the case F ∈ Z n×n , the parameter r for quantization can be used as the same to satisfy β(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) ≤ η( ), to keep the same level of performance. In fact, it was attributable to the fact the value of ∂β/∂r is the same with ∂α/∂r , as ∂β ∂r (0, 0, 0, r) = ∂α ∂r (0, 0, 0, r)
which corresponds to the case T = I n and R = 0 n×m for (21) with (26), i.e., conversion of F is not considered thanks to the condition F ∈ Z n×n . For the general case 12 , the following corollary states that, given the parameter r with respect to (13) , the proposed controller (24) with the parameters {r y,i } p i=1 , {r r,i } q i=1 , and {r u,i } m i=1 of quantization step sizes for (6) and (22) can have the same level of performance, when they satisfy
. 12 For the general case, the design of the quantized controller (13) would consider the error due to truncation of F as well, which can be computed as
as the same as in (32) and (33), with respect to the controller (4) where x = Ls 1 x, but it can be neglected in terms of the choice of r, as it can be made arbitrarily small, by the choice of L and s 1 .
Corollary 3: Given (L, s 1 , s 2 , r) such that α(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) ≤ η( ), and r > 0 satisfying (28), there exist L > 0, s 1 > 0, and s 2 > 0 such that γ(L , s 1 , s 2 , r ) ≤ η( ).
Proof: If α(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) ≥ γ(L, s 1 , s 2 , r ) , there is nothing to prove. Suppose α(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) < γ(L, s 1 , s 2 , r ) , and define f (k) := α(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) − γ(kL, ks 1 , ks 2 , r ) , so that f (1) < 0. From (26), (27), and (28), we have α(0, 0, 0, r) ≥ γ(0, 0, 0, r ) , and hence it follows that f (0) > 0. By continuity, there exists 0 < k < 1 such that α(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) = γ(kL, ks 1 , ks 2 , r ) . The encryption with the use of additively homomorphic encryption is also straightforward, after the conversion to have integer state matrix. Using the properties H1-H3 only, just as the same as in (18) , the controller (21) can be encrypted as
where the information of matrices is stored in the controller as plaintexts. As the following corollary, the encryption (29) is also able to operate for infinite time horizon, with the same level of performance.
Corollary 4: Supposing that γ(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) ≤ η( ) holds, the encryption (29) with (24b) guarantees u(t) − u (t) ≤ , for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Proof: From (1) and (2), it is obvious that (24a) and (29) have the same form of the dynamics for the messages, as
∈ Z m , t = 0, 1 · · · , and ∆ 0 ∈ Z n , where z(t) = Dec(z(t)) and u(t) = Dec(u(t)). It is clear that the upper bound for the size of ∆ z (t) , ∆ u (t) , and ∆ 0 with respect to (2) is not larger than that of (1).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section provides simulation results of the proposed scheme applied to tracking control of three inertia system [17] ; let the plant (3) be given aṡ
where J = 0.01 kg · m 2 , b = 0.007 N · m/(rad/s), and k = 1.37 N·m/rad, and the system (4) be designed as an observer- based discrete-time feedback controller with T s = 50 ms, aŝ are the proportional and integral feedback gains, and the injection gain for the observer, respectively, so that the estimatê x p (t) converges to the plant state x p (t · T s ), and the output y p (t) of the plant follows the reference r(t) ≡ 1.
To convert the state matrix F ∈ R 7×7 of (30), the matrix R is designed such that det(zI 7 − (F − RH)) = z 7 − 3z 6 + 3z 5 − 3z 4 + z 3 − 1, so that (30) is converted to the form (25) as in Remark 5, with 
Finally, Fig. 1 and 2 shows the simulation results of the proposed encrypted controller, which operates without reset of the state. Compared with the quantized controller, Fig. 1 shows that the performance of the proposed encrypted controller can be preserved with the choice of parameters, as suggested in Theorem 2. And, Fig. 2 supports the statement of Corollary 1; increasing the parameter 1/L only, it suppresses the effect of injected errors and obtains the same level of performance with the unencrypted model.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have suggested that linear dynamic controllers can be encrypted to operate for infinite time horizon with the same level of performance, when the transmission of the encrypted plant input to the controller is admitted. The proposed method simply converts the state matrix of the given controller by pole-placement design, so that it fixes the scale of the control variables and eliminates the necessity of the reset of the state. To conceal the control parameters as well as the signals, the use of LWE-based cryptosystem has been considered, in which it has been seen that the effect of injecting errors to the messages is controlled by closed-loop stability.
APPENDIX

A. Cryptosystem based on Learning With Errors
This subsection briefly introduces the LWE-based encryption scheme [13] , [16] . The encryption, operation, and decryption algorithms are described as follows, where the size N of the plaintext space is supposed to be chosen as power of 2.
• Setup(1 λ ). Choose the bound σ ∈ N for the errors 13 , the modulus q = N · 2 q0 with q 0 ∈ N ∪ {0}, and ν 0 ∈ N and d ∈ N so that ν := 2 ν0 and ν d−1 < q ≤ ν d . Define the spaces C and C of ciphertexts as C = Z n+1 q and C = Z (n+1)×n q , where Z q := {0, 1, · · · , q − 1}, n ∈ N is chosen sufficiently large to achieve the λ-bit security 14 , and n := d(n + 1). Return params = (q, σ, n, ν, d, n ). • KeyGen(params). Generate the secret key sk ∈ Z n as a row vector such that sk ≤ σ. Return sk. • Enc(m ∈ Z N , sk). Generate a random vector a ∈ Z n q and an error e ∈ Z such that |e| ≤ σ.
. Return k · c mod q.
• Enc (k ∈ Z N , sk). Generate a random matrix A ∈ Z n×n q , and a row vector E ∈ Z n such that E ≤ σ. 13 The Gaussian distribution is considered for injected errors in usual, but we consider uniform distribution for all the random numbers, for simplicity. 14 The parameters (n, q, σ, λ) are known to satisfy n log q−log σ ∝ λ log λ . 15 In terms of the modulo operation by q for the ciphertexts, we abuse notation and use m mod q := m − m∈ Zq for m ∈ Z.
follows [1, sk] ·Mult(Enc (k), c) = E ·col{c i } d−1 i=0 +k[1, sk]·c, and Dec(Mult (Enc (k) 
i=0 ≤ ν. Remark 6: One of the benefit of the described scheme is that each unit of the operations can be implemented with simple modular matrix multiplication, in which the operations such as ( · mod q) or ·/ν can be performed by bit operations, thanks to the parameters (q, N, ν) chosen as power of 2.
More explanations and example codes can be found in [18] .
B. Technical Lemmas and Proofs
The following proposition considers the closed-loop stability when the sizes of perturbations e x (t) and e u (t) of the controller (4) may depend on the sizes of x(t), y(t) and r(t).
Proposition 5: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, suppose that there exist non-negative constants
If e 0 ≤ η( ), then (5) holds for t ≥ 0 and t ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Proof: As e 0 ≤ η( ), Assumption 1 implies that y(0) ≤ Y + and x(0) ≤ X + , by causality, and hence e x (0) ≤ η( ) and e u (0) ≤ η( ) by (31). Suppose e x (t) ≤ η( ) and e u (t) ≤ η( ) for t = 0, 1, ..., τ . By Assumption 1 and causality, (5) holds for 0 ≤ t < (τ + 1) · T s and 0 ≤ t ≤ τ . Then, it follows that y(τ + 1) ≤ Y + by continuity, and x(τ + 1) ≤ X + . Thus, e x (τ + 1) ≤ η( ) and e u (τ + 1) ≤ η( ), and hence, by induction, e x (t) ≤ η( ) and e u (t) ≤ η( ) for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}. It concludes that (5) holds for all t ∈ N ∪ {0} and t ≥ 0.
The following Lemma states that the performance of the controller (36) over Z and that of (34) over Z N with modulo operation can be equivalent in the closed-loop, if N is sufficiently large to cover the range of the output of the controller.
Lemma 2: Consider the closed-loop systems (3) and (34) with u(t) = S u (mod(u(t), N, {u min ,i } m i=1 )), and (3) and (36) 
) and x(t) = x(t) mod N for all t ∈ N∪{0}, and the closed-loops have the state x p (t) and the output y p (t) of (3) as the same for all t ≥ 0.
Proof: Observe that x(0) = x(0) mod N . Then, we suppose x(t) = x(t) mod N at time t, and the state x p (t) of (3) with respect to (34) and that with respect to (36) are the same at t = t · T s . First, as (34) and (36) share the same input y(t) at time t, it is obvious that x(t + 1) = x(t + 1) mod N and u(t) = u(t) mod N . It follows that u(t) = mod(u(t), N, {u min ,i } m i=1 ), so the plant with (34) and the plant with (36) have the input u p (t) as well as the state x p (t) as the same, for t·T s ≤ t < (t+1)·T s . And, by continuity, they also have the state x p (t) as the same, at t = (t + 1) · T s . Therefore, by induction, it is concluded that x(t) = x(t) mod N and
, and the plant with (34) and the plant with (36) have the signals u p (t), x p (t), and y p (t) as the same, for all t ≥ 0. 1) Proof of Proposition 1: With x(t) = Ls 1 x(t), and u(t) = S u (u(t)), we consider the closed-loop of (3) and (4), where e x (t) = Ls 1 δ x (t), e u (t) = Ls 1 s 2 δ u (t) + (S u (u(t)) − Ls 1 s 2 u(t)), and e 0 = Ls 1 δ 0 . First, it can be derived that 16 and ∆ 0 ≤ ∆ Enc . With these terms, we rewrite (4) as
x(t + 1) = F x(t) + Gy(t) + P r(t) + ∆ x (t) u(t) = Hx(t) + Jy(t) + Qr(t) + ∆ u (t)
with the relations x(t) = Ls 1 x(t) and u(t) = S u (u(t)), where e x (t) = Ls 1 (δ x (t) + ∆ x (t)) e u (t) = Ls 1 s 2 (δ u (t) + ∆ u (t)) + (S u (u(t)) − Ls 1 s 2 u(t)) e 0 = Ls 1 (δ 0 + ∆ 0 ).
With the function α defined in Proposition 1, we define β(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) := α(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) +   Ls 1 · β x (s 1 ) Ls 1 s 2 · β u (s 1 , s 2 ) Ls 1 ∆ Enc .   , (37) so that it satisfies β(0, 0, 0, 0) = [0, 0, 0] . Then, by Proposition 5 with the functions Ls 1 (α x + β x ) and Ls 1 s 2 (α u + β u ) + r/2, β(L, s 1 , s 2 , r) ≤ η( ) implies that the closed-loop of (3) and (36) satisfies (5) for all t ≥ 0 and t ∈ N ∪ {0}. From S u (u(t))−u (t) < and u (t) ∈ U, the design (14)-(16) guarantees that u min ,i ≤ u i (t) ≤ u min ,i +N −1 holds, where u(t) = col{u i (t)} m i=1 , for all i = 1, · · · , m and t ∈ N ∪ {0}. Therefore, Lemma 2 in Appendix B completes the proof.
3) Proof of Proposition 2: Let λ 1 , · · · , λ n−2m , σ 1 ± jω 1 , · · · , σ m ± jω m be the eigenvalues of F , where j ∈ C is such that j 2 = −1, λ i ∈ Z for every i = 1, · · · , n − 2m, and σ i ∈ Z and ω i ∈ Z for every i = 1, · · · , m. It is clear that the transformation of F to the modal canonical form yields a matrix consisting of integers; there exists T ∈ R n×n such that the matrix T F T −1 ∈ R n×n takes the form of
where γ i = 0 or 1 for each i = 1, · · · , n − 2m − 1, Λ i = σ i ω i −ω i σ i ∈ Z 2×2 for each i = 1, · · · , m, and Γ i = 0 2×2 or I 2 , for each i = 1, · · · , m − 1.
4) Proof of Theorem 2:
We show that the closed-loop of (3) and (21) is stable with respect to the perturbations e 0 , e z (t), and e u (t). Given > 0, define θ( ) := η( )/ max(1, T (1 + R )), where T ∈ R n×n is such that T · T = I n . And, let e 0 ≤ θ( ), e z (t) ≤ θ( ), and e u (t) ≤ θ( ), for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}. Consider (4) as an auxiliary system, with e 0 = T e 0 and e x (t) = T (e z (t) + Re u (t)). As e 0 = Te 0 and e z (t) = Te x (t) − Re u (t), it follows, from (20) and (21), that it satisfies z(t) = Tx(t) for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}, and (4) and (21) have the output u(t) as the same, as well. As θ( ) is defined to guarantee e 0 ≤ η( ), e x (t) ≤ η( ), and e u (t) ≤ η( ) for all t, Assumption 1 implies that the controller (21) guarantees that (5a) hold for all t ≥ 0, and u(t) − u (t) ≤ and z(t) − Tx (t) ≤ T , for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}.
And, as e 0 = 0, e z (t) = 0, and e u (t) = 0 implies e x (t) = 0 and e 0 = 0, the conditions of Assumption 2 with respect to the closed-loop of (3) and (21) hold as the same, where the bound for the state z (t) = Tx (t) can be obtained as max v∈X Tv ≤ T · max v∈X v = T · X .
Then, since F ∈ Z n ×n in (21), the proof is completed by applying Theorem 1 to the closed-loop of (3) and (21), in which the signal [y(t) , u(t) ] ∈ R p+m is regarded as the input of the controller. The function γ is obtained analogously to (32), (33), (35), and (37); define a function P that maps the parameters of (4) to the function β, as P : ( F , G , H , J , P , Q , n, p, q, X , Y , R ) → β(L, s 1 , s 2 , r).
(38)
Then, we define the same function γ θ with respect to (21), as 
